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IN 1931 the Supreme Court decided the case of United States v,. Kirby
Lumber Co.2 The corporation involved had issued bonds at par in 1923
and in the same year had purchased some of these bonds in the open
market at a figure less than par. Holding contrary to the views of the
lower tribunals3 but in accord with Treasury Regulations, 4 the Supreme
Court ruled that the difference represented taxable income. .Mr. Justice
Holmes declared for the Court:
"Here there was no shrinkage of assets and the taxpayer made
a clear gain. As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30
assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct. We
see nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial definitions.
The defendant in error has realized within the year an accession
to income, if we take words in their plain popular meaning, as they
should be taken here." 5
It was unfortunate that Mr. Justice Holmes saw nothing to be accom-
plished by a further consideration of the previous cases, for the Kirby
decision has resulted in considerable confusion as to the income tax
consequences of a cancellation of indebtedness, and placed a heavy burden
upon corporations seeking to adjust their capital structures. Many finan-
cially embarrassed corporations, with their bonds selling far below par,
have desired to purchase and retire these securities in order to reduce
current interest obligations and avert bankruptcy. But as such a step
*A companion article on Tie Revenue Act of x939 and the Assumption of I,:dcbtcdncss
in Tax-Free Exchanges will appear in the June issue.
1. Assistant Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury Department.
The views expressed herein are entirely those of the writer. Nothing herein is to he
construed as the official opinion of the United States Treasury Department.
2. 284 U. S. 1 (1931).
3. Cases cited in MAGILL, TAXABLE INcO nE (1936) 225, n. 52.
4. Id. at 223, n. 47.
5. 284 U. S. 1, 3 (1931).
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under the Kirby decision would have resulted in an income tax on the
difference, between the face amount of the bonds and the figure at which
they were purchased, few corporations were either able or willing to pay
such a heavy price for the reduction of their indebtedness.
In response largely to corporate pleas, voiced principally by the rail-
roads,6 the Revenue Act of 1939' contains provisions designed to afford
tax relief in these cases." Section 215 adds paragraph (9)0 to Section
22(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, relating to exclusions from gross
income. The addition provides that the amount of income attributable
to the discharge of the indebtedness of a corporate taxpayer in an unsound
financial condition shall be excluded from gross income, if the taxpayer
consents to regulations providing for a reduction in the basis of property
held by it.10 The reduction is prescribed under new paragraph (3)11 added
6. Hearings on Revente Revision Before Committee on Ways and M, eans, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 232-248; 84 CoNG. REC. 10468 (1939).
7. For other discussions of aspects of the Revenue Act of 1939 see Alvord and
Biegel, Basis Provisions for Stock Dividends Under the 1939 Revenue Act (1940) 49 YALE
L. J. 841; Eichholz, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Basis of Stock Dividends and
Rights (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 404; Darrell, Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal
Inconw Tax (1940) 53 HAxv. L. Ray. 977.
8. H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 5.
9. INT. REv. CODE § 22(b) (9) (1939).
10. Section 22(b) (9) reads as follows:
"(9) INCOME FROm DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNES.-In the case of a cor-
poration, the amount of any income of the taxpayer attributable to the dis-
charge, within the taxable year, of any indebtedness of the taxpayer or for
which the taxpayer is liable evidenced by a security (as hereinafter in this
paragraph defined) if-
(A) it is established to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, or
(B) it is certified to the Commissioner by any Federal agency
authorized to make loans on behalf of the United States to such
corporation or by any Federal agency authorized to exercise regula-
tory power over such corporation,
that at the time of such discharge the taxpayer was in an unsound financial
condition, and if the taxpayer makes and files at the time of filing the return,
in such manner as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary,
by regulations prescribes, its consent to the regulations prescribed under
§ 113(b) (3) then in effect. In such case the amount of any income of the
taxpayer attributable to any unamortized premium (computed as of the first
day of the taxable year in which such discharge occurred) with respect to
such indebtedness shall not be included in gross income and the amount of
the deduction attributable to any unamortized discount (computed as of the
first day of the taxable year in which such discharge occurred) with re-
spect to such indebtedness shall not be allowed as a deduction. As used in
this paragraph the term 'security' means any bond, debenture, note, or cer-
tificate, or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by any corporation, in
existence on June 1, 1939. This paragraph shall not apply to any discharge
occurring before the date of the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1939, or in
a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1942."
11. INT. REV. CODE § 113(b) (3) (1939).
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to Section 113(b) of the Code, relating to the adjusted basis of prop-
erty. 2 The relief is limited to discharges occurring after June 29, 1939
and in taxable years beginning after December 31, 193S and prior to
January 1, 1943.
As the amount excluded from gross income is the amount of income
attributable to the discharge of indebtedness and as that amount is the
maximum amount that may be applied in reduction of basis, the amend-
ment still makes necessary precise answers to the questions raised by
the Kirby case. Moreover, while the amendment as originally proposed
extended only to the bonded indebtedness of a corporation, in its final
form it is applicable to most corporate debts. Our examination of the
extent to which income is realized on a cancellation of indebtedness must
therefore cover a wide front.
A. EXTENT TO WHICH INCOME IS REALIZED ON A CANCELLATION
OF INDEBTEDNESS
1. Discharge of indebtedness in general. Given a solvent taxpayer,
and placing to one side those special cases where the discharge results in
a gift 3 or a contribution to capital, the Kirby principle that income in
the constitutional sense may be derived from the discharge of indebted-
ness is generally recognized.' 4 The discharge'0 may in itself be the source
12. Section 113(b) (3) reads as follows:
"(3) DISCHARGE OF INDEnRazTEss.-Where in the case of a corporation
any amount is excluded from gross income under § 22(b) (9) on account of
the discharge of indebtedness the whole or a part of the amount so excluded
from gross income shall be applied in reduction of the basis of any property
held (whether before or after the time of the discharge) by the taxpayer
during any portion of the taxable year in which such discharge occurred.
The amount to be so applied (not in excess of the amount so excluded from
gross income, reduced by the amount of any deduction disallowed under
§22(b) (9)) and the particular properties to which the reduction shall be
allocated, shall be determined under regulations (prescribed by the Commis-
sioner with the approval of the Secretary) in effect at the time of the filing
of the consent by the taxpayer referred to in § 22(b)(9). The reduction
shall he made as of the first day of the taxable year in which the discharge
occurred except in the case of property not held by the taxpayer on such
first day, in which case it shall take effect as of the time the holding of the
taxpayer began."
13. Gibson v. Comm'r, 83 F. (2d) S69 (C. C A. 3d, 1936) ; I. T. 1982, II-1 Cu-1.
BuLL. 109 (1924); cf. Smith Insurance Serv., Inc., 9 B.T.A. 284 (1927).
14. The income realized is ordinary income and not capital gain, as it does not arise
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset [§ 117(b)]. I. T. 2846, XIV-1 Cux.n Buu..
112 (1935). The statutory classification is open to question. A bondholder who pays
$90 to a corporation for a $100 bond which is later redeemed at $100 realizes $10 capital
gain by virtue of § 117(f). This corporation which borrows $100 and repays $90 wvould
seem to be in a similar situation.
15. While the debt must be pro tanto discharged, the fact of discharge may be implied
from the circumstances. Thus, if a corporation transfers wage checks unclaimed after a
11551940]
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of income, as in the purchase of obligations at less than their face amount,
or it may result in income which is regarded as derived from a more
traditional source, such as salary or dividends. If A's employer in pay-
ment for services rendered cancels a debt which A owes him, A will be
regarded as having received additional compensation to the extent of
the amount cancelled. 6 If a corporation cancels a stockholder's debt,
the cancellation will be treated as a dividend paid to the latter.' 7  While
the situations are infrequent, discharges of a solvent debtor may occur
for reasons that are non-donative."8 A bank in receivership anxious to
terminate its affairs may prefer to accept sixty or seventy-five cents on
the dollar rather than to institute litigation or foreclosure proceedings ;0
a creditor may hope to induce future purchases from his debtor by can-
celling an obligation of the latter; a company may hope to retain salesmen
if it writes off advance commissions not earned; a lessee may decide to
abandon his lease and forfeit his right to the return of an advance pay-
ment.20
number of years to profit and loss, the amount of such checks constitutes income. North
American Coal Corp. v. Comm'r, 97 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938); Charleston &
W. C. Ry. v. Burnet, 50 F. (2d) 342 (App. D. C. 1931); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v.
Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 618 (1931) ; Great
Northern Ry. v. Lynch, 292 Fed. 903 (D. Minn. 1921); G. M. Standifer Constr. Corp.,
30 B.T.A. 184 (1934); Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 23 B.T.A. 888 (1931). But there
must be some reasonable ground for the debtor's action. Cf. United States v. Little War
Creek Coal Co., 104 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
16. Reginald Denny, 33 B.T.A. 738 (1935); cf. I. T. 2043, 111-2 Curt. BULL. 94
(1924).
17. Waggaman v. Helvering, 78 F. (2d) 721 (App. D. C. 1935), cert. denied, 296
U. S. 618 (1935); Wiese v. Comm'r, 93 F. (2d) 921 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), cert. denied,
304 U. S. 562 (1938) ; Fitch v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ; Cohen
v. Comm'r, 77 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 610 (1935);
Hudson v. Comm'r, 99 F. (2d) 630 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 644
(1939) ; Hugh H. Miller, 25 B.T.A. 418 (1932) ; Henry D. Muller, 16 B.T.A. 1015 (1929);
Ida L. Dowling, 13 B.T.A. 787 (1928); Virginia H. Holden, 9 B.T.A. 220 (1927).
18. Model Laundry, Inc., B.T.A. Memo. Op. Docket No. 93493, Jan. 15, 1940; Spo-
kane Office Supply Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op. Docket No. 86762, April 29, 1939. Both cases
involved cancellation of rent owed by solvent lessee.
19. Cf. United States v. Little War Creek Coal Co., 104 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 4th,
1939) (involving settlement of claim).
20. Commissioner v. Langwell Real Est. Corp., 47 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931);
Warren Serv. Corp., 404 C.C.H. 1940 Fed. Tax Serv. 19333 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940);
cf. cases cited in note 15 supra. The entire amount of the forfeited payment should be
the measure of the income. The holding in the Warren case that the present worth of
the amount which would have been payable at the end of the lease is the amount of
income seems erroneous in this regard. The result was based upon the absence of interest
payments on the lessor's part, the court stating that if interest were payable, inclusion
of the full amount at forfeiture would be justified as the value of the interim use of the
money would be balanced by the interest payable. But on this argument income would
be realized at the start of the lease, which the court denied. The deduction for interest
paid, and the effect of a difference in the rates of interest were also not considered by
the court. See Comment in 401 C. C. H. 1940 Fed. Tax Serv. 110392.
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With respect to bonded indebtedness, income results whether the obli-
gations were issued and then purchased by the corporation at less than
their face amount in the same year, as in the Kirby case, or in different
years.2 ' Similarly, income results whether the bonds were purchased in
the open market2 2 or directly from the sole holder.' The former require-
ment of the Regulations that the purchased bonds must be retired,2 has
been dropped,2' apparently with the concurrence of the courts.2  The in-
debtedness may be discharged with either cash or new obligations such
as bonds or notes,27 but the exchange of stock for bonds raises special
problems to be considered later.
2. Discharged debtor in financial straits. Where, as typically, the
debtor is financially embarrassed, the tax consequences of a cancellation
by his creditors remain uncertain. Four possible theories may be spelled
out from an examination of cases on the subject. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue early ruled, in 1923, that a taxpayer received no income by
virtue of a discharge of indebtedness resulting from an adjudication in
bankruptcy or a creditors' composition agreement approved by a court.2-
It stated, however, that where creditors of a partnership forgave part
of its indebtedness because its condition was such that receivership would
have destroyed the business, the amount forgiven was income. Thus,
if a creditor forgave a debt without desiring to benefit the debtor but
because the latter was unable to pay, the debtor realized income.2- The
ground of the distinction between the two rulings was not disclosed.
21. Commissioner v. Norfolk S. R. ., 63 F. (2d) 304 (C.C. A. 4th, 1933), cert.
denied, 290 U. S. 672 (1933) ; Norfolk S.R.R., 25 B.T.A. 925 (1932).
22. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1 (1931).
23. Commissioner v. Coastwise Transp. Co., 62 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932), 71
F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 595 (1934).
24. U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 68(2).
25. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 22(a)-18 and succeeding Regulations. A requirement
of formal retirement would permit the corporation to place the income consequent upon
the retirement in the year most favorable to it.
26. 'ontana, IV. & S. R. R. v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 62 (1934), aff'd per crlrim, 77
F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 604 (1935); Virginia Iron,
Coal & Coke Co., 29 B.T.A. 1087 (1934); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v.
I. R. T. Co., 19 F. Supp. 234 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) (purchase of bonds required by sining
fund agreement) ; accord, Woodward Iron Co., 24 B.T.A. 1050 (1931) ; cf. Garland Coal
& Mining Co. v. Helvering, 75 F. (2d) 663 (App. D. C. 1934). But cf. Transylvania
R. R. v. Comm'r, 99 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (corporation expressly did not retire
bonds, being entitled under a lease to receive rentals equal to the interest on outstanding
bonds).
27. Commissioner v. Coastwise Transp. Co., 62 F. (2d) 332 (C.C. A. 1st, 1932),
71 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 595 (1934) ; Briarcliff, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 731 (1937).
28. I. T. 1564, I-1 Cum BuLL. 59 (1923) ; cf. S. M. 1495, 111-1 Cr.x. Buu.. 103
(1924).
29. 1. T. 1547, I-1 Cumi. BuLL 58 (1923).
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Perceiving no distinction, the Board of Tax Appeals held in Meyer
Jewelry Co.30 that the creditors' partial forgiveness of the debts of a
financially embarrassed debtor did not give rise to income within the
constitutional meaning of the term. The Board relied upon the Eisner v.
Macomber rule that an enrichment through increase in the value of
capital investment is not income, even though it recognized that the debtor
was relieved from paying the amount forgiven, achieved a more favor-
able balance sheet and benefited through being able to remain in business.
The Meyer rule was followed in later Board decisions, whether the
debtor was actually insolvent or merely financially embarrassed." The
Board was simultaneously holding, also without regard to the financial
condition of the debtors, that income likewise was not realized in the
bond purchase cases."
Two circuit court of appeals decisions complete the picture at this
stage. In Commissioner v. Simmons Gin Co." the taxpayer was in-
debted to commission firms for loans on which its cotton was the col-
lateral. The cotton market dropped so that the loans exceeded the col-
lateral, resulting in the taxpayer's insolvency. Virtually all its creditors
then agreed to cancel one-half of its indebtedness, and arrangements were
made for the payment of the remaining half. The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the saving was not income in the constitutional
sense, for, inasmuch as assets had remained the same despite the decrease
in liabilities, nothing was received or drawn to the taxpayer's use. The
court said:
"The Gin Company had no assets to offset the indebtedness that
was forgiven and when such indebtedness was discharged its lia-
bilities were decreased but its assets remained exactly the same both
before and after the release of such indebtedness. There is a distinc-
tion between the release or discharge of a liability to a solvent and
to an insolvent taxpayer. Suppose an insolvent had assets of the
value of $10,000 and owed $100,000; that its creditors agreed to settle
for $20,000 payable in four 'annual equal payments, evidenced by
notes and secured by a mortgage on such assets. Could it be said
the debtor received income in the sum of $80,000- eight times the
total amount of its assets?
"Since there were no assets off-setting or representing such in-
debtedness released, nothing was received or drawn by the Gin
Company to its separate use, benefit and disposal. There was a
30. 3 B.T.A. 1319 (1926).
31. John F. Campbell Co., 15 B.T.A. 458 (1929), aff'd, 50 F. (2d) 487 (App. D. C.
1931); Simmons Gin Co., 16 B.T.A. 793 (1929), aff'd, 43 F. (2d) 327 (C. C. A. 10th,
1930); Eastside Mfg. Co., 18 B.T.A. 461 (1929); Progress Paper Cb., 20 B.T.A. 234
(1930) ; Herman Senner, 22 B.T.A. 655 (1931).
32. Cases referred to in note 3 supra. There was almost no linkage of the two lines
of authority.
33. 43 F. (2d) 327 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930).
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mere diminution of loss and a 'mere diminution of loss is not gain,
profit, or income.' Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co." 3.
In the second case, Burnet v. Campbell Co.," a taxpayer in "financial
distress, and . . .probably insolvent," was granted a partial cancellation
of some of its debts by creditors who hoped thus to secure payment of
the balance. It was thereby enabled to remain in business and realize
a profit in succeeding years. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the creditors' forbearance did not result in income
to the debtor, because the term did not apply to such a partial cancella-
tion for the purpose of effecting payment of the balance.
At this point, the Kirby decision intervened with its holding that the
discharge of a debt by payment of a lesser sum produces income, and
with its statement that assets previously offset by the obligation were
made available through the discharge. The decision, however, had no
immediate effect on the Board's disposition of non-bond purchase cases.
Three more decisions found no income where creditors had granted a
partial cancellation because of the debtor's inability to pay the full
amount. 6 In one case, a" the Board argued that the indebtedness was
forgiven so that the debtor might continue as a going concern, that the
parties contemplated no profit from the transaction, and that the for-
giveness merely relieved it of a portion of its liabilities.
Further, in Dallas Transfer & Tcrmninal Warehouse Co. v. Cow-
missioner,5 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that no income was
realized where an insolvent lessee obtained a cancellation of past due
rent through the lessor's desire to keep the building occupied by retaining
the tenant. As part of the transaction the lessee conveyed to the creditor
its principal asset, an equity in other property. The court said that the
lessee was insolvent before and after the transaction, so that it received
nothing. There was therefore an absence of income in the constitutional
sense. While the taxpayer in the Kirby case possessed greater assets upon
cancellation, here there was merely a discharge of liabilities without an
34. Id. at 329. In Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170 (1926), a cor-
poration borrowed a sum of money in German marks and later repaid the loans when
marks had fallen in value. The difference between the value of the borrowed marks and
the amount paid was held by the Commissioner to be income. The borrowed money had
been used by a wholly-owned subsidiary in the performance of construction contracts.
Losses were sustained in such work, and the excess of losses over income was more than
the amount claimed to be income. The Supreme Court held that the transaction in ques-
tion did not result in a gain within the Eisner v. Maconber test since "the result of the
whole transaction was a loss." Id. at 175.
35. 50 F. (2d) 487 (App. D. C. 1931).
36. E. B. Higley & Co., 25 B.T.A. 127 (1932); Towers & Sullivan Mfg. Co., 25
B.T.A. 922 (1932); Porte F. Quinn, 31 B.T.A. 142 (1934). The Board relied chiefly
upon the Meyer Jewelry Co. and Campbell Co. cases.
37. E. B. Higley & Co., 25 B.T.A. 127 (1932).
38. 70 F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); see note 42 infIra.
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increase of assets. Finally, the Treasury dropped from its Regulations
the sentence stating: "If, however, a creditor merely desires to benefit
a debtor and without any consideration therefor cancels the debt, the
amount of the debt is a gift from the creditor to the debtor and need not
be included in the latter's gross income.'"" In its stead was inserted:
"Income is not realized by a taxpayer by virtue of the discharge of his
indebtedness as the result of an adjudication among his creditors if
immediately thereafter the taxpayer's liabilities exceed the value of his
assets." 4 The Bureau contended that this change implied that income
was realized in the obverse case where assets exceeded liabilities.
In 1937 the Board of Tax Appeals suddenly announced a new approach.
In Lakeland Grocery Co.,41 the creditors of an insolvent debtor in re-
ceivership partially cancelled its indebtedness by accepting payment of
$89,237.55 less than the full amount. The cancellation brought the
debtor from an insolvent to a solvent condition, with assets exceeding
liabilities by $39,596.33. The Board said that the Meyer, Campbell and
Dallas Transfer cases were not in point, since the debtors involved had
been regarded as insolvent both before and after the cancellation,42
whereas here assets free from liabilities were present after the cancella-
tion. Stating that this clear increase in assets was income under the
Kirby rule, the Board found taxable income on the transaction to the
extent of the excess of assets over liabilities, or $39,596.33. The Board,
in Madison Railways, thereafter applied its insolvency rule to the case
of a purchaser of bonds which was insolvent both before and after the
purchase to hold that no income resulted from the purchase. 3
In the remaining pertinent case of Transylvania Railroad v. Coin-
inissioner,44 a corporation had leased all its property to an operating
company in return for a rental largely consisting of the payment of the
interest on the lessor's bonds. The lessor later purchased some of these
bonds, but, not desiring to reduce the rental, did not retire them. The
39. U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 64, REVENUE ACr OF 1932 and prior Regulations.
40. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 22(a)-14, REVENUE ACT OF 1934, and succeeding
Regulations.
41. 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937); accord, The Haden Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op., Docket No.
91776, Oct. 20, 1939.
42. However, in the Meyer case, the debtor was probably solvent both before and
after the cancellation. In any event the question was not examined by the Board. Nor
was it considered in the Campbell case. In the Dallas Transfer case the taxpayer was
regarded by the Board as solvent after the cancellation. The circuit court of appeals
treated the taxpayer as insolvent before and after the cancellation by including its
$200,000 capital stock as a liability: Prior to the cancellation other liabilities exceeded
assets, but after the transaction assets exceeded liabilities by almost the amount can-
celled if, as proper, the capital stock be disregarded.
43. 36 B.T.A. 1106 (1937).
44. 99 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
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Board's holding that the purchase created taxable income,40 was reversed
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in part on the ground that there
was practically a total loss in the value of the lessor's property.""
It is apparent that the decisions establish no single authoritative rule.
Four possible views may be sketched:
(a) No income if cancellation designed to assist financially embarrassed
debtor. It may be contended that no income results if creditors cancel
indebtedness in order to restore a financially embarrassed, though not
necessarily insolvent, debtor to a better financial condition. This appears
to have been the original Board rule, for the decisions did not concern
themselves with whether the financial embarrassment of the debtor ex-
tended to actual insolvency or with the relation of assets to liabilities
after the cancellation. Thus the Board said in E. B. Higley & Co.:
"The debt was forgiven so that the business might be rehabilitated
and continued as a going concern. The parties contemplated no profit
from the transactions, which merely relieved the taxpayer from a
portion of its liabilities."'47
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia adopted a similar
approach in Burnet v. Campbell Co., stating:
"'We do not believe that the term 'income' as commonly under-
stood applies to the partial cancellation by a creditor of a debt due
to him from a disabled creditor, in order that such debtor may
therefore be enabled to pay the balance of the debt." °
But if a solicitous attitude on the creditors' part be made the cri-
terion, so that the motive for the cancellation must be that of assistance
to the debtor, a debtor who benefited through a bank's settlement of
claims for fifty cents on the dollar to avoid litigation would realize
income, even though it was financially embarrassed. Moreover, this view
would produce a tax when a financially embarrassed corporation bought
its bonds in the open market, for it could hardly be said that the requisite
attitude on the part of the creditors was present. It is difficult to perceive
any reason for not taxing in the cases quoted from above and taxing in
the case of a bond purchase. While differences in the creditor's motive
would distinguish the cases factually, there is no justification for making
motive a factor. The motive was not donative in the cases mentioned, for
the action represented an attempt to salvage something from the wreckage.
The saving cannot therefore be non-taxable as a gift."0 Aside from the
45. 36 B.T.A. 333 (1937).
46. This view of the court wras, however, contrary to the Board's finding that the
corporation failed to show a failure of assets or loss of the money originally borrowed.
47. 25 B.T.A. 127 (1932).
48. 50 F. (2d) 487, 488 (App. D. C. 1931).
49. None of the Board decisions holding that no income was realized characterized
the transaction as a gift. The early Regulations, quoted supra p. 1160, however, apparently
treated these transactions as donative in nature.
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gift question, motive would seem irrelevant. This approach may there-
fore be reduced to the proposition that a financially embarrassed debtor
never realizes income from the cancellation of his debts, regardless of
the motive of the cancelling creditors.
The new paragraph added to Section 22(b) (9) by the Revenue Act
of 1939 denies this proposition. It excludes from gross income the
amount of any income attributable to the discharge of the indebtedness
of a taxpayer who is "in an unsound financial condition" at the time
of such discharge. Under the theory broached above, this new paragraph
is entirely unnecessary for no income would be attributable to such a
discharge. Congress, however, evidently thought that some income arises
despite the debtor's financial straits.
(b) No income if debtor insolvent prior to cancellation. It might be
argued from the cases that income is not realized if the debtor was
insolvent prior to cancellation. Thus, the Simmons Gin case stated that
a distinction existed between solvent and insolvent debtors and held that
the latter do not realize income on a cancellation of their debts.50 This
position is derived from two related sources. One is Bowers v. Kerbaugh-
Empire Co."' where, in holding that the saving in dollars resulting from
the payment of a loan at a time when the currency in which the loan
was measured had declined in value was not income, the Supreme Court
argued:
"The contention that the item in question is cash gain disregards
the fact that the borrowed money was lost, and that the excess of
such loss over income was more than the amount borrowed. When
the loans were made and notes given, the assets and liabilities of
defendant in error were increased alike. The loss of the money
borrowed wiped out the increase of assets, but the liability remained.
The assets were further diminished by payment of the debt. The loss
was less than it would have been if marks had not declined in value,
but the mere diminution of loss is not gain, profit, or income.'' 2
Most of the cancellation cases finding no income because of the debtor's
insolvency rely upon this case, stating that the cancellation served merely
to decrease liabilities and thereby to diminish losses. The Court's reliance
on the loss of the money borrowed, however, was proven faulty in the
later case of Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co."' Here, in a situation
better suited to the application of such a theory, the Court relied upon
50. In F. W. Sickles Co. v. United States, 404 C. C. H. 1940 Fed. Tax Serv. I 9286
(Ct. Cl. 1940) it was held that no income is realized if the taxpayer is insolvent after
the forgiveness of the indebtedness.
51. 271 U. S. 170 (1926).
52. Id. at 175.
53. 282 U. S. 359 (1931).
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the annual nature of the income tax to tax for one year compensation
received under a contract for losses sustained in earlier years.'
The treatment of the Kerbaugh-Empire case in the Kirby case pro-
vided the second source for the position being considered. Mr. Justice
Holmes distinguished the former case in these words:
"In Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co. the defendant in error owned
the stock of another company that had borrowed money repayable
in marks or their equivalent for an enterprise that failed. At the
time of payment, the marks had fallen in value, which so far as it
went was a gain for the defendant in error, and it was contended by
the plaintiff in error that the gain was taxable income. But the
transaction as a whole was a loss, and the contention was denied.
Here there was no shrinkage of assets and the taxpayer made a
clear gain. As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30
assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct."r15
The distinction adopted is surprising when it is considered that the
opinion later cites Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co. with approval. But
in the cases arising after the Kirby case in whicl no income is found
because of the debtor's insolvency, much is made of this matter of free
assets. Thus, in the Dallas Transfer case the Court said:
"In effect the transaction was similar to what occurs in an in-
solvency or bankruptcy proceeding when, upon a debtor surrender-
ing, for the benefit of its creditors, property insufficient in value to
pay his debts, he is discharged from liability for his debts. This does
not result in the debtor acquiring something of exchangeable value
in addition to what he had before. There is a reduction or extin-
guishment of liabilities without any increase of assets. There is an
absence of such a gain or profit as is required to come within the
accepted definition of income. . . . The decision (the Kirby case)
. . . that the increase in clear assets so brought about constituted
taxable income is not applicable to the facts of the instant case, as
the cancellation of the respondent's past due, debt to its lessor did
not have the effect of making the respondent's assets greater than
they were before that transaction occurred. Taxable income is not
acquired by a transaction which does not result in the taxpayer
getting or having anything he did not have before."r 0
But if the condition of the assets after cancellation is the important con-
sideration, the debtor's status prior to the cancellation is not determina-
tive, so that insolvency before the cancellation does not alone compel the
conclusion that income is not realized. For the same reason there can be
no distinction between a debtor who is insolvent prior to cancellation and
54. See discussion in MAGIL, op. cit. stpra note 3, at 215 et seq.
55. 284 U. S. 1, 3 (1931).
56. 70 F. (2d) 95, 96 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
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a debtor ATho is financially embarrassed but not insolventY Emphasis
on free assets after cancellation must lead inevitably to the solution
adopted by the Board in the Lakeland case, now to be considered.
(c) Board of Tax Appeals "net assets" approach. In the Lakcland
decision the Board unequivocally held that, in the case of a debtor insol-
vent prior to cancellation, income would result to the extent that assets
exceeded liabilities after cancellation. No other court has adopted this
rule of thumb, though two courts since the Kirby case have had an
opportunity to apply it in situations where the debtor was insolvent
before cancellation and presumably solvent thereafter. 8 The rule, in-
volving precise asset valuation, is hard to administer. The tax on the
income realized obviously narrows the difference between assets and
liabilities. Despite this apparent inconsistency, such a mechanical approach
-concerned not with the debtor's condition prior to cancellation but with
the relation of assets to liabilities after cancellation- is logically com-
pelled by the cases which, relying on the above-quoted remarks in the
Kirby case concerning the relation of assets to liabilities, find no income
because of the insolvent condition of the debtor. We must therefore in-
quire whether the Supreme Court decisions require such a freeing of
assets and the consequent net assets test.
(d) Cancellation results in income regardless of financial condition of
debtor. A taxpayer's net worth has never been made a criterion of taxable
income. Suppose that taxpayer A, at the beginning and the end of 1939,
has liabilities exceeding assets by $50,000. In 1939 he sells for $40,000
stock which in 1937 cost him $10,000. The gain realized is unquestionably
$30,000. Suppose that taxpayer B, in a similar condition of insolvency,
receives $30,000 as compensation for services in 1939. I-fere, too, a gain
of $30,000 is realized even though B may be required to turn the $30,000
over to his creditors to reduce his liabilities. Let us assume, in the second
case, that B's employer is a creditor to the extent of $30,000 and that,
instead of paying B his salary in money, the employer cancels the $30,000
debt. In the language of the cases discussed above the cancellation serves
merely to reduce liabilities, leaving no assets free for B's use. Would
any court hold that B does not receive $30,000 of income derived from
"salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of whatever kind
and in whatever form paid ?" It would be difficult to hold that B realizes
income when he receives $30,000 from employer C which he at once uses
57. The House Ways and Means Committee Report does not draw a distinction,
but indicates that the term "unsound financial condition" covers both cases. H. R. REP.
No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 23-24.
58. Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r, 70 F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A.
5th, 1934) (see the discussion of this case in the Lakeland opinions) ; Transylvania R. R.
v. Comm'r, 99 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
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to pay the debt owing to creditor D, but realizes no income when employer
and creditor are the same person.
Basic to our tax law is the theory that the realization of income depends
on the outcome of each separate transaction whence taxable income can
be derived, and not upon the net result of all such transactions (except,
of course, as expenditures and losses during the taxable year may be
permitted to enter into the computation of net income). Thus the balance
sheet or net worth at the end of the year and its relation to the balance
sheet or net worth at the beginning of the year are, for this purpose,
immaterial. Given the discharge of a $40,000 debt by payment of $10,000,
or the purchase and retirement of a $40,000 bond for $10,000, our inquiry
is whether these transactions can result in taxable income and, if so, how
that income is to be measured and when it is to be taxed. The Kirby and
other cases indicate that such transactions may give rise to income, as
do the transactions of buying and selling stock, of working for a salary,
of receiving trust income. These same cases demonstrate that the income
is the difference between the face amount of the obligation and the amount
paid in discharge of the indebtednessY2  Other cases, like the Sanford &
Brooks case, indicate that under our annual system of income taxation
this income should be taken into account in the year of discharge."C The
transaction thus begins when the money is borrowed and is "closed" for
tax purposes when the obligation is discharged." Under general income
tax theory the result of other transactions, and hence the overall con-
59. Complications may arise where the amount received on incurrence of the obliga-
tion is less than its face amount. See p. 1178 infra.
60. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359 (1931) prevents a relatiun back
which would take account of the prior history of the transaction in respcet of the ine of
the borrowed money. Helvering v. American Chicle Co., 291 U. S. 426 (1934) pre-
vents treatment of the transaction by means of an adjustmcnt Uf its initial phase.
61. Two analogies support the theory that the basic facturs, in the computation of
gain on the cancellation of indebtedness are the amount received vhen the loan w:as made
and the amount paid on discharge of the indebtedness. The first is the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the bond discount and premium cases: Old Colony R. R. v. Comm'r,
284 U. S. 552 (1932) and Helvering v. Union Pacific R. R., 293 U. S. 282 (1934). The
second case held that if bond discount is viewed not as excess interest but as a loss, it is
realized only upon payment of the bonds at maturity and not at their issuance (as the
Commissioner contended in view of issuance prior to March 1, 1913), although the cer-
tainty of the loss permits its anticipation through annual amortization by a taxpayer on
the accrual basis. The issuance of the bonds is thus not a closed transaction but merely
the beginning of a transaction which is dosed only when the bonds are discharged accord-
ing to their terms. The case of discharge of indebtedness at less than face amount should
be an a fortiori situation. While the first case probably leans in the other direction,
in that the premium on bonds issued prior to March 1, 1913 was held not subject to tax,
the discount decision is the later. The second analogy is the short sale. If a short sale is
made in 1939 and covered by a purchase in 1940, the resulting gain is taxable income in
1940 rather than 1939, indicating that a purchase can close a transaction. Cf. Frances B.
Farr, 33 B.T.A. 557 (1935) ; I. T. 2187, IV-2 Cus. BLL. 25 (1925); U. S. Treas. Reg.
103, § 19.117-6.
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dition of the balance sheet, are as immaterial to the computation of income
here as in the sale and employment transactions just described. It appears,
under this reasoning, that income should be realized on a discharge of
indebtedness without regard to whether the taxpayer is insolvent, finan-
cially embarrassed or solvent, if the discharge is accomplished by payment
of less than the face amount of the obligation.
2
The Regulations approved in the Kirby case drew no distinction be-
tween solvent and insolvent corporations, but merely stated that if "a
corporation purchases and retires any of such bonds at a price less than
issuing price or face value, the excess of the issuing price or face value
over the purchase price is gain or income for the taxable year."," Nor
did the Supreme Court draw that distinction. The language it used to
distinguish the Kerbaugh-Empire case is unfortunate, but even that
language does not require differentiation between the two classes of
corporations. The Court spoke of the "whole transaction as a loss,"
which differs from saying that the taxpayer was insolvent. The money
borrowed may have been profitably used, so that although other ventures
produced insolvency the transaction itself was not a money-loser. The
assets purchased with the borrowed money may still be held at the same
value. Indeed, the Court has found, income where the value of those
assets has actually declined. 4 The Kirby decision further said that
"assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct" were
made available. Yet the reduction of liabilities and consequent release
of assets need not be limited to zero upwards. Reduction of a minus
net worth of $20,000 to a minus net worth of $5,000 also accomplishes
that result, for the taxpayer is so much nearer to solvency. Finally, while
it said that "there was no shrinkage of assets," it will later appear that
succeeding decisions have not been halted by a decline in the total value
of the assets.
While this last approach appears to accord more closely with accepted
income tax conceptions, difficult emotional obstacles are present in these
cases which have served to turn many courts from the rigorous road of
tax theory. Adding the burden of an income tax to the difficulties of an
62. A distinction may exist between these two cases: A, having liabilities of $100,000
and a piece of property worth $100,000 but with a $10,000 basis, sells the property for
$100,000 and realizes a $90,000 gain. B, having liabilities of $100,000 and assets of $10,000,
turns the $10,000 over to his creditors in return for cancellation of the remaining indebt-
edness. A's gain is represented by actual assets in hand, even though they may have to be
handed over immediately to creditors; B, however, never possessed $90,000 of assets dur-
ing the taxable year. It may be contended that a debtor left with no assets realizes no
income; or, stated differently, that the income realized is limited to the assets on hand
after the cancellation, which is not the same as the net assets theory of the Lakeland
case. But this distinction contradicts the theory underlying the Kirby case.
63. E.g., U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 68(1) (C).
64. Infra p. 1168.
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insolvent or financially embarrassed debtor is an unwelcome task for
the courts. The sternness of the tax collector is here highlighted by the
consideration shown by the cancelling creditors, even though such con-
sideration may be motivated by business reasons. Imposition of the tax
either serves to reduce the amount they may salvage from the wreckage
or makes it that much harder for the debtor to survive. But considera-
tion of this phase of the problem may be reserved.
3. Discharged obligations issued on the purchase of property. The
Kirby case involved a situation where the bonds later discharged had
been issued for money. Upon their discharge the transaction was com-
pleted and gain could be cast, as money was involved at both ends. But
suppose a corporation buys property worth $50,000 with bonds or notes
whose face amount is $50,000. Three years later the corporation dis-
charges the obligation by a payment of $30,000. It still possesses the
purchased property whose value remains $50,000. Is the Kirby case
applicable so that $20,000 of income is realized, or does the discharge
merely result in a reduction of the cost, and thus the basis, of the property
to $30,000? In Helvering v. American Chicle Co. the taxpayer corpora-
tion, in purchasing the assets of another corporation, had assumed its
liabilities, including bonds. Some of the bonds were later purchased on
the open market at less than their face amount and retired according to
a provision that required annual amortization. Both the Board" and
rhc Second Circuit Court of Appeals6" held that no income was realized
- rather that the cost of the assets was reduced by the savingY7 The
circuit court of appeals said:
"But the distinction does seem to us critical between obligations
whose consideration is money, and those issued or assumed for
property which the obligor still holds. . . . When a taxpayer gets
money by issuing an obligation which he later discharges for less
than its face, the transaction is completed, because money need not
be sold or exchanged to be 'realized'. So we read United States
v. Kirby Lumber Co. . . . But if he buys property by an obliga-
tion in the form of a bond, note, or the like, and if it remains in
kind after the debt is paid, there can be no 'gain'. The cost has
indeed been definitely settled, but that is only one term of the
equation; as long as the other remains at large, there is no 'realized'
gain."03
The Supreme Court reversed in a decision"0 which ignored the fact that
property instead of money had been received for the obligation incurred.
65. 23 B.T.A. 221 (1931).
66. 65 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
67. Accord, I. T. 2195, IV-2 Cu. BuLT. 36 (1925); L T. 2406, VII-1 Cu . Bu.r..
68 (1928); cf. Progress Paper Co., 20 B.T.A. 234 (1930).
68. 65 F. (2d) 454, 455 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
69. 291 U. S. 426 (1934).
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The Court stated that it found nothing to distinguish the case in principle
from the Kirby case. While there seems to be merit in the circuit court's
position, practical difficulties would arise where the property had been
disposed of in whole or in part, and with respect to the depreciation
deduction. ° Consequently, the Supreme Court's view that income is
realized and the basis is not affected seems preferable.7
Would the decision have been the same if the value of the property
in the above example had dropped to $30,000, instead of remaining at
$50,000? In the American Chicle case the Supreme Court presumed from
the record's silence as to the state of the taxpayer's assets and as to gains
or losses on the transaction that there could have been a substantial profit,
and that an increase in assets accompanied the decrease in liabilities. In
Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp.,72 a fleet of ships had
been acquired in 1922 by a taxpayer which made payment partly in notes
for $608,400 secured by a mortgage on the ships. Later in 1924 the
taxpayer retired $152,000 of the notes for $75,000; and in 1925 issued
bonds in the amount of $375,000, secured also by the ships, for the
$456,300 of notes remaining -in both cases dealing only with the seller
of the property. As of 1924, the vessels had depreciated in value from
$1,267,500 to $1,083,419.73. The taxpayer had incurred deficits in 1923
and 1924 but had a surplus in 1925. In finding all these facts immaterial,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that, while as a bookkeeping
matter the vessels had declined in value, the ships were still being operated
and the situation might well change.7" Since the value of the mortgaged
property was more than sufficient to pay the indebtedness, income was held
to have resulted upon the decrease of the liability.
The Board, too, has stressed this last point in L. D. Coddon & Bros.,
Inc."4 The taxpayer, on purchasing property in 1931, had become liable
for a purchase money mortgage which in 1933 amounted to $19,250. In
70. Cf. B. F. Avery & Sons, Inc., 26 B.T.A. 1393 (1932), app. dism'd, 67 F. (2d) 98
(C. C. A. 6th, 1933). The rulings cited mtpra note 67 were withdrawn after the decision
in the Avery case, I. T. 2772, XIII-1 Cum. BULL. 212 (1934); I. T. 2771, XIII-1 Cum.
BULL. 200 (1934).
71. Where the purchase price is paid prior to transfer of the property and adjust-
ments in the purchase price are made through a cancellation of obligations which likewise
occurs prior to the transfer, the cancellation will presumably be treated as a reduction of
cost. Des Moines Improvement Co., 7 B.T.A. 279 (1927); cf. Union Pacific R. R., 32
B.T.A. 383 (1935), other issues aff'd, 86 F. (2d) 637 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; L. D. Coddon
& Bros., Inc., 37 B.T.A. 393 (1938).
72. 62 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932), 71 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. 'A. 1st, 1932), cert.
denied, 293 U. S. 595 (1934).
73. In a case wherein it was stipulated that the decrease in the value of the bonds
was primarily the result of a decline in the value of the corporate assets, the Board has
held such shrinkage in asset value to be immaterial. Consolidated Gas Co. of Pittsburgh,
24 B.T.A. 901 (1931).
74. 37 B.T.A. 393 (1938).
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that year the mortgage was satisfied for $12,000 because the land, once
worth $20,000, had appreciably declined in value. While the loss in value
was greater than the saving obtained, the Board found income because
the property was sufficient to pay the indebtedness. It left open the ques-
tion whether a similar result would obtain where the value of the property
was less than the amount of the obligation., This was the situation in
Hextell v. Huston,7" where land worth $20,000 had been purchased in
1918, partly for a $10,000 note secured by a mortgage. In 1935, when
the land was worth $6,500, the note was paid off for $6,500; $500
interest was waived. The district court said that the scaling downm of the
indebtedness produced a realization of loss, so that the $3,500 saving
in the principal was thus balanced by the loss in value, leaving no gain
to be taxed. The decision is quite erroneous as to the realization of a loss.
At best, it stands only for the proposition that gain is not to be recognized
where the value of the property obtained upon incurrence of the obliga-
tion has declined below the amount of the obligation.77 This particular
situation cannot properly be excepted from the rule that the realization
of income in these cases need not await the disposal of the property, for
that rule necessarily divorces the factors of basis and value from the
realization of income.73 The value of the property in relation either to
its original cost or to the amount of the discharged obligation, and any
correspondence between loss in value and amount of indebtedness can-
celled are therefore immaterial. If the property purchased (or the money
borrowed) by means of the obligations later discharged has been com-
pletely lost, the discharge at less than the face amount of the obligations
should result in income. There is no reason why the American Chicle
and the Coastwise Transportation cases should not be carried to their
logical conclusion, for the reliance placed by the Kcrbaugh-Empire de-
cision on the loss of the money borrowed has generally been regarded
as completely discredited by the later decisions.
Where the purchaser has merely bought the property subject to a
mortgage so that the indebtedness discharged was not a personal obliga-
tion, the Board has said that no income is realized if the discharge was
effected by payment of an amount less than the indebtedness - the pay-
ment merely satisfies an encumbrance on the property without release of
assets previously offset by the obligation."' But as the debt to which
75. Cf. cases cited supra note 20, which disregard a present loss.
76. 28 F. Supp. 521 (S. D. Iowa 1939).
77. Cf. P. J. Hiatt, 35 B.T.A. 292 (1937) (appears to accept this proposition).
78. Such a rule tends to offset ordinary income on the cancellation against capital
loss on the disposition of the property, so that the balance might not be close in the case
of an individual taxpayer.
79. Fulton Gold Corp., 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934) (permitting Commissioner to reduce
the basis of purchased property by amount of the cancellation and denying ta.xpayer's
contention that reduction xwas improper because cancellation resulted in realization of
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the property was subject became part of the purchaser's cost basis, it is
not so clear that the case can be distinguished from one involving a
personal obligation."0
4. Corporation's indebtedness cancelled by stockholders. The earliest
case on cancellation of indebtedness, United States v. Oregon-Washington
Railroad & Navigation Co.,"' held that cancellation of a corporation's
debt to its sole stockholder did not give rise to a realization of income
by the corporation, but constituted instead a contribution to its capital.
The Regulations82 early adopted this approach and were approved in
Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., Inc."8 While the Oregon-
Washington case apparently distinguished between the cancellation of
the principal (a contribution to capital) and cancellation of the interest
on the debt (presumably income), the former Regulations and the later
cases did not draw such a distinction. In the Auto-Strop case royalties,
loans and interest due were, on their cancellation, treated alike as con-
tributions to capital. In Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr.,4 the Board treated
the cancellation of interest due on the sole stockholder's loan to the cor-
poration as a contribution to capital, stating it could not be treated differ-
ently from the cancelled principal. Dissenting opinions, however, argued
that the cancellation of the interest should result in income. In apparent
reliance on these opinions, the Regulations were changed to state that
the cancellation by a stockholder amounts to a contribution to capital to
the extent of the principal of the debt. 5 The Board's decision has since
been reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Helvering v.
Jane Holding Corp.,8 partly on the ground that the former Regulations
income); American Seating Co. v. Comm'r, 14 B.T.A. 328 (1928), other issues in 50 F.
(2d) 681 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) ; P. J. Hiatt, 35 B.T.A. 292 (1937).
80. The difficulties occasioned where the personal debt is cancelled after the dispo-
sition of the property and which justify the separation of purchase and cancellation that
underlies the American Chicle rule are absent when only a charge against the property is
removed. The property would still be in the taxpayer's hands and its basis may there-
fore be readily adjusted.
81. 251 Fed. 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
82. U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 51, and succeeding Regulations through U. S. Treas,
Reg. 94, Art. 22(a)-14.
83. 74 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). Forfeit of amounts paid on a subscription to
capital stock results in a contribution to capital even though the persons forfeiting were
not stockholders. Comm'r v. Inland Finance Co., 63 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933);
Realty Bond & Mtge. Co. v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 771 (Ct. Cl. 1936); Illinois
Rural Credit Ass'n, 3 B.T.A. 1178 (1926) ; Industrial Loan & Investment Co., 17 B.T.A.
1328 (1929).
84. 38 B.T.A. 960 (1938). The sole stockholder, a trust, desired to make distribu-
tions to its beneficiaries but was not empowered to do so while the corporation was in-
debted to it. The indebtedness was therefore cancelled.
85. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 22(a)-14, and Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-14; ef. U. S.
Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 22(a)-14 and prior Regulations.
86. 109 F. (2d) 933 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
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dealt only with the principal indebtedness and that the interest thereon
was to be differently treated. In finding that income resulted from the
cancellation of the interest due on the indebtedness, the court relied on
the previous deductions taken by the corporation for the interest as it
accrued. Thus in a case where the corporation is on the cash basis, the
decision is not authority for the Regulations' present distinction between
interest and principal. This distinction is difficult to justify where, as
in the instance of the cash basis, the interest has not been previously used
to offset taxable income.
Although the cases do not consider the point, it seems clear that the
relationship of stockholder and corporation should not automatically cause
the cancellation to be considered as a contribution to capital rather than
as a realization of income. Suppose creditors A, B, and C of corporation
D cancel its indebtedness to them because of the corporation's financial
condition. Creditor A happens to own a few shares of stock in the cor-
poration. Does his cancellation result in a contribution of capital, and
that of creditors B and C in a realization of income? Presumably not,
as creditor A did not hope to gain anything qua stockholder and hence
did not intend a contribution to capital. In the few cases on the subject,
the stockholder-creditor has been either the sole or a principal stock-
holder, so that his cancellation was directly linked to his status as stock-
holder. While the quantum of the creditor's interest as a stockholder is
generally indicative of intent, it need not be controlling, and the intent
may be supplied by other factors.8 7
87. Compare the reliance of Member Sternaagen in the .3allinhhrodt case, 38 B.T.A.
960 (1938), on the intent of the cancelling creditor. Cancellation by a staclholder in
connection with withdrawal from the corporation should not be a contribution to capital.
The Regulations state that if the shareholder "gratuitously" forgives the debt, the
transaction amounts to a contribution to capital. The effect of the requirement that the
forgiveness be gratuitous is not clear. In Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.
(2d) 933 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940), the circuit court of appeals stated that the forgiveness
was not gratuitous, but in return for good and valuable consideration: the corporation's
surrender of its right to have the assets of the trust kept undistributed while the corpora-
tion remained indebted to the trust But as the corporation could not have prevented the
cancellation, the action of the trust can scarcely be said to have produced consideration
on the corporation's part. The word "gratuitously" can scarcely be given the effect of
limiting the Regulations to donative transfers, for the cases go beyond such transfers
and hold that what would be income to another taxpayer because of lad: of donative
intent becomes a contribution to capital in the case of a corporate debtor. Forgiveness
in the Jane Holding Corp. case was gratuitous but not donative as the motive was not
to benefit the corporation but to effect a distribution by the trust. If the reliance upon
the gratuitous nature of the forgiveness is intended to exclude transactions in which con-
sideration moves from the corporation, so that there is both a payment to the extent of
the consideration and a cancellation of the remaining indebtedness, the exclusion of the
indebtedness thus discharged by payment would be proper. But the circuit court did not
find the value of the "consideration" moving from the corporation but merely its existence,
which under this interpretation of the Regulations is not a complete answer.
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The House Ways and Means Committee report states:
"Wherever a discharge of indebtedness is accomplished by the
transfer by the debtor of property in kind, such as by the issue of
its own stock, the difference between the amount of the obligation
discharged and the value of the property transferred is the amount
which may be excluded from gross income and applied in reduction
of basis." 88
While the general rule therein stated is valid,' the statement implies that
if a corporation issues stock worth $400 in exchange for a $1,000 bond,
thereby discharging its obligation on the bond, it realizes $600 income.
The transaction may, however, be thought to involve a contribution to
capital: the bondholder has paid for stock with the discharged obligation.
Certainly the bondholder turned stockholder now depends directly upon
the corporation's future operations for the return of his remaining invest-
ment."0 That he has in effect paid more for his stock than it was worth
is immaterial, for in this respect the situation is the same as cancellation
by a creditor who is already a stockholder of a debt owed him by the
corporation. Unless, however, the exchange of bond for stock is part
88. H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 25.
89. If a debt is paid by a transfer of property of equal value, any gain inherent in
the property is realized, so that the difference between the amount of the debt discharged
and the basis of the property is taxable income. E. F. Simms, 28 B.T.A. 988 (1933);
Twin Ports Bridge Co., 27 B.T.A. 346 (1932); Carlisle Packing Co., 29 B.T.A. 514
(1933) ; Ohio Central Tel. Co., 28 B.T.A. 96 (1933) ; Hagan Corp., 21 B.T.A. 41 (1930) ;
Marbara Corp., 36 B.T.A. 519 (1937); I. T. 1562, II-1 Cum. BULL 33 (1923); cf.
Helvering v. Midland Mut. Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216 (1937). These cases need not be
rested upon the Kirby case, although it is frequently cited. The income is considered as
gain on a sale or exchange and hence is a capital gain. Rogers v. Comm'r, 103 F. (2d)
790 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), cert. denied, 60 Sup. Ct. 98 (U. S. 1939); William R. Kenan,
Jr., 40 B.T.A. 124 (1939); Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), aff'd,
83 F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 573 (1936). But cf. Bling-
ham v. Comm'r, 105 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). Where the discharged debt ex-
ceeds the value of the transferred property, the difference can hardly be considered as
gain on the disposition of the property. Instead, with respect to such excess, the transac-
tion must be treated as a pro tanto cancellation of the debt, as the sentence quoted indi-
cates. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.113 (b) (3)-I (F) so states. William Levitt, B.T.A.
Memo. Op., Dec. 30, 1938. But cf. Springfield Industrial B'ld'g Co., 38 B.T.A. 1445
(1938).
90. In cases involving an exchange of stock for bonds, par for par, the courts have
not permitted the corporation any deduction in the year of the exchange for the un-
amortized discount on the bonds, but have considered the transaction as an adjustment
of the corporation's capital structure. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d)
990 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 618 (1931) ; Liquid Carbonic Corp., 34
B.T.A. 1191 (1936) ; Pierce Oil Corp., 32 B.T.A. 403 (1935) ; 375 Park Ave. Corp., 23
B.T.A. 969 (1931). If the bonds were discharged by means of other bonds of a lower
face amount than that of the discharged obligations, the corporation would realize in-
come. Comm'r v. Coastwise Transp. Corp., 62 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932), 71 F.
(2d) 104 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 591 (1934).
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of a reorganization or recapitalization,"1 the bondholder will be allowed
a loss measured by the difference between the cost of the bond and the
value of the stock, so that his basis for the stock is its fair market value.
The stockholder cancelling a debt would presumably receive an increase
in his basis measured by the amount of the debt? 2 This difference in
the basis treatment -in that the bondholder treats the cancelled amount
as lost whereas the stockholder still regards it as part of his investment
in the corporation- may well occasion a difference in treatment on the
corporation's side, thus justifying the quoted statement.
5. Nature of liability. In the Kirby case the liability in question was
incurred through the receipt of money. On its discharge by the payment
of money, therefore, the gain made on the transaction was clearly defined.
In the American Chicle case and similar cases the liability was incurred
on the purchase of property and therefore could have been viewed as repre-
senting the receipt of a money equivalent at that time. Thus, in the usual
cancellation of indebtedness case, the debtor received "money" when the
liability arose, and later on its discharge paid back less money. But
suppose the creditor has not originally received "money," so that there
is no asset to offset the liability on its occurrence. Thus, taxpayer A with
a judgment of $10,000 entered against him because of his negligent
operation of an automobile is able to satisfy the judgment by a payment
of $8,000. Taxpayer B, who has become liable for double the par value
of his bank stock, $10,000 in all, settles that liability by a payment of
$8,000. Taxpayer C, who endorsed his friend's $10,000 note, is able,
on the friend's default, to settle his liability as endorser for $8,000. Tax-
payer D who, in consideration of the gifts of others, agreed to contribute
$10,000 to a certain charity, satisfies his pledge by a contribution of
91. See note 97 infra.
92. Edward Mfallinckrodt, Jr., 38 B.T.A. 960 (1938), other issues in, Helvering v. Jane
Holding Corp., 109 F. (2d) 933 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940). The stockholder whose indebted-
ness is cancelled is therefore not entitled to a deduction for a bad debt. But the other
decisions are not all in accord. Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. Helvering, 69 F. (2d)
151 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), ccrt. denied, 292 U. S. 650 (1934) (no deduction); American
Cigar Co. v. Comm'r, 66 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 2M0 U. S. 6 9
(1933) (no deduction); Deeds v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931) (de-
duction allowed; no discussion of contribution to capital aspect); Carl C. Harris v.
Comm'r, 19 B.T.A. 895 (1930) (deduction allowed); Ransom E. Olds, 18 B.T.A. 1215
(1930) (no deduction), rev'd on stipul., 59 F. (2d) 1070 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931). The
Board recently stated that a cancellation by a stockholder of a worthless debt owed by
the corporation is not a contribution to its capital and its amount cannot be added to
the stockholder's basis. Hughes Tool Co., 40 B.T.A. 962 (1939).
93. Where the cancelled obligation represents interest or rent due, the debtor can
be considered as having received the money equivalent of the use of the borrowed money
or the rented property. See discussion infra p. 1175. Where the obligation is not p a-
sonal but a lien on the property, the debtor may perhaps be said to have received a
money equivalent through the medium of a lower purchase price.
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$8,000. Do taxpayers A, B, C, and D each realize $2,000 income on
satisfaction of these liabilities? Two cases point to a negative answer.
In Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co.,9 4 a corporation in 1914 approved
an appraisal of its assets which added $3,000,000 to its surplus account.
It then issued a bond dividend to its stockholders. In 1926 and 1927
it purchased some of these bonds, presumably on the open market, at
less than their face amounts, cancelled them, and credited the difference to
surplus. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the difference was
not income. After pointing out that in the Kirby case assets had been
increased by the money received, the Court said that here the incurrence
of the obligation was attended merely by a writing up of book value
without any increment in assets. The corporation simply retained a part
of the surplus it had intended to distribute. The case of taxpayer D
above was put and answered by saying that the payment of the $8,000
did not result in a realization of income, but merely fixed the amount
of the deduction for a charitable contribution. As the bonds were clearly
an obligation of the corporation, the case squarely holds that the dis-
charge of a liability for less than its amount does not result in income
if no asset is received on its occurrence. The decision contradicts the
Board's "net assets" approach, for although assets were released which
had previously been subject to an obligation and the net of assets over
liabilities thus increased (the Board's criterion) the court found no in-
come.
In Ruben v. Commissioner,"5 the taxpayer and two others had acquired
practically all of corporation X's stock. This stock was held for them
by corporation Y, all of whose stock they owned, the taxpayer's interest
being one-fourth. Minority stockholders of corporation X sued for an
accounting and damages derived from the stock purchases and the man-
agement of corporation X. The lower court rendered a money judgment
against corporation Y and its stockholders as individuals. The case was
settled while pending on appeal by corporation Y's paying a sum of
money to the plaintiffs. The Commissioner claimed that one-fourth of
the sum was a taxable dividend to the taxpayer, as the latter's obligation
had been satisfied by the corporation. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that no income was realized - the taxpayer had received
nothing, but had been relieved by the settlement of a claimed liability.
On the authority of this case our taxpayer A above would not realize
income, but would merely have reduced his loss.
Whereas the Ruben case situation and that of taxpayer A present the
weakest set of facts in which to find income, the Rail Joint case presents
the strongest situation. In the latter case the incurrence of the obligation
94. 61 F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) (criticized in MAGMI, op. Cit. supra note 3,
at 230-1).
95. 97 F. (2d) 926 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
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benefited the debtor, for it effected the payment of a dividend which the
corporation was expected to distribute in the normal course of business.
The case could have been viewed as a payment of a cash dividend and the
return of the cash to the corporation for the bonds. Taxpayers B, C,
and A, and the taxpayer in the Ruben case, however, were involved in
loss situations in which the receipt of income would seem incongruous.
The approach of the courts must then be taken as opposed to any realiza-
tion of income where no tangible consideration has been received in
return for the incurrence of the obligation.
6. Effect of previous deductions. Suppose a creditor cancels both
the principal and interest due him on a loan because of his debtor's
financial condition. Where the debtor is solvent, the amount of both
principal and interest will be included in gross income. Presumably the
debtor on the cash basis will also obtain an interest deduction in the year
of cancellation. 6 The debtor on an accrual basis will have already taken
the deduction which should not be disturbed." Suppose, however, that
the debtor is insolvent, and being on the accrual basis, has annually de-
ducted the interest payable. Under the view ex-pressed in 2(d) above,
as income would be realized here as well as for the solvent tax-payer, no
different problems would arise. But if we accept the net assets theory,
96. As will be discussed later, § 215 of the Revenue Act of 1939 assumes that the
difference between the face amount of a bond issued at a discount and its purchase price
is income, and that the unamortized discount would be deductible. As bond discount is
viewed by the courts as a form of interest, the assumptions underlying § 215 support the
statement in the text. Cf. Helvering v. Union Pacific R R., 293 U. S. 232 (1934). The
deduction for "interest paid" can be upheld only by considering the passage of the inter-
est through the taxable gross income gate as a payment of such interest. It is question-
able whether the word "paid" can be so stretched. It may also be contended that the
deduction is not allowable because of absence of actual payment and that in view of the
loss of the deduction the cancellation of the interest should not give rise to tamxable in-
come. Where the interest charge is part of the cost of doing business, allowing the deduc-
tion for the cancelled interest seems proper as its actual payment is no more necessary than
payment of the principal. The situation is analogous to that of property purchased with
notes later cancelled, where, as discussed above, the basis of the property remains un-
changed and the saving becomes income. While the inclusion in gross income of the
amount of interest cancelled as income arising from a discharge of indebtedness and
the deduction of the same amount as interest paid will ordinarily cancel out for a solvent
taxpayer, the importance of the proper treatment of interest cancelled where the tax-
payer is in an unsound financial condition will be apparent when the effect of §215 is
considered.
97. In Hummel-Ross Fibre Corp., 40 B.T.A. No. 123 (1939), stock was issued in
exchange for bonds and accrued interest, the par value of the stock being equal to the face
amount of the bonds. The Board sustained the deduction for accrued interest against the
contention that the interest obligation had been cancelled, stating that instead of cancel-
lation there was an exchange of stock for bonds plus accrued interest. While gain may
have resulted to the extent of the difference betveen the fair market value of the steck
and the amount of the obligations, such gain would not be recognized as the exchange
was a tax-free recapitalization.
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with the result that no income arises from the cancellation of the principal
or interest as such, do the previous deductions for interest nevertheless
compel inclusion of the cancelled interest in gross income? As the deduc-
tions were accorded on the assumption that the interest would be paid,
tax equity would seem to require that upon cancellation of the interest
the deductions be "balanced" by such an inclusion, provided that the
statute of limitations has run so as to prevent disturbance of the deduc-
tions. Analogous is the case of the bad debt charged off and later paid,
where the creditor must include in gross income the amount paid if he
has previously obtained a bad debt deduction. If the taxpayer were on
the cash basis, as no deduction exists to create the necessity for equitable
adjustment, the interest would not be includible in gross income.
On this analysis of tax equities, however, the principal should likewise
be included in gross income regardless of the financial condition of the
debtor. Adjustment is necessary in the case of the deduction for accrued
interest because such deduction has caused an amount of taxable income
(from other sources) included in gross income to escape tax through
the reduction effected in the total gross income. But essentially the same
may be said with respect to the unpaid principal: an amount received
by the taxpayer and not taxed because expected to be repaid, has in
fact not been repaid and hence has escaped tax. If adherents to the net
assets theory refuse to tax the unpaid principal, they should likewise
exclude unpaid interest from gross income, even though accrued interest
deductions have previously been obtained. This is the result which the
Board apparently reaches."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in Commissioner v. Auto
Strop Safety Razor Co., Inc. that where the principal stockholder cancelled
interest due on a loan to the corporation, the fact that the corporation on
98. Towers & Sullivan Mfg. Co., 25 B.T.A. 922 (1932) (cancellation of both debts
incurred on purchase of goods and the interest thereon did not give rise to income where
taxpayer was insolvent, even though cost of goods had been previously taken as a de-
duction and interest had been accrued as a deduction).
Where the accrued interest deducted is part of the cost of doing business, the situation
is similar to that where a taxpayer has taken a deduction for the cost of goods pur-
chased and has later obtained a cancellation of the notes given in payment. On grounds
of tax equity the cancellation would result in income so that the true cost of the goods
may be reflected in the tax amount. The Board decisions, though uncertain, tend to deny
a tax on cancellation despite the previous deduction for the cost of the goods purchased.
Towers & Sullivan Mfg. Co., supra; The Haden Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op., Docket No.
91776, October 20, 1939 (refusing to depart from the Lakeland rule because debts can-
celled had previously been deducted as business expenses in the form of rent and ma-
terials purchased) ; cf. Progress Paper Co., 20 B.T.A. 234 (1930). But cf. Avery & Sons,
Inc., 26 B.T.A. 1393 (1932) (finding of income on grounds that taxpayer was solvent
and that debts cancelled had previously figured as deductions). See also § 270 of the
Bankruptcy Act, as amended, which reduces basis by the amount of indebtedness can-
celled, but "not including accrued interest unpaid and not resulting in a tax benefit on
any income tax return."
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the accrual basis had previously taken annual deductions for interest did
not change what would otherwise be a contribution to capital into the
receipt oft income. But in the Rail Joint case, the same court had stated
that if a charitable pledge of $1,000 made in one year was satisfied by
a payment of $500 in a later year, the difference was income in the
later year if the $1,000 had been deducted in the earlier year. Cancella-
tion and payment were regarded as finally fixing the proper amount of
the deduction, and inclusion of the difference was necessary to insure
proper reflection of the entire transaction. The distinction between this
case and the interest cases is far from clear. The Jane Holding Corp.
case99 disagreed with the Auto Strop decision and held that where
accrued interest had been deducted by a solvent corporation, later can-
cellation by the stockholder of the interest due resulted in income to
the corporation rather than a contribution to capital, since the income
items offset by the previous deductions then had to be restored to taxable
income. Although this decision seems proper, it does not require that
the principal indebtedness forgiven by the stockholder likewise, on tax
equities, result in income to the corporation. Although the amount of the
loan received by the corporation has escaped tax, nevertheless as all sums
originally received from stockholders have likewise escaped tax, the prin-
cipal indebtedness may be included with these sums and properly treated
as a contribution to capital. But while the interest forgiven may in one
sense be a contribution to capital, the fact that it has through previous
deductions permitted taxable income to avoid tax prevents it from fol-
lowing the principal as a tax-free contribution to capital. 10
B. CONSIDERATION OF PROVISIONS ADDED BY REvrNur AcT or 1939
1. Further problems regarding amount of income to be excluded.
(a) "Income attributable to the discharge . . . of any indebtedness."
New paragraph (9) of Section 22(b) excludes from gross income at
the taxpayer's election "the amount of any income of the taxpayer
attributable to the discharge . . . of any indebtedness of the tax-
99. 109 F. (2d) 933 (C. C. A. Sth, 1940). This decision has been discussed in
note 87 supra. The court emphasized that the corporation vas solvent. The attempted
distinction of the Auto Strop decision on the ground that a contribution to capital was
intended will hardly hold, as the court itself realized, for on the tax equity theory even
a donative forgiveness would not justify exclusion of the interest.
100. Similarly, as a gift is not income, if principal and accrued interest are forgiven
with donative intent, the principal may escape tax even on the tax equity theory, but the
forgiven interest should result in income. Where the relationship is not that of stocz:-
holder-corporation, or the motive not donative, there is no justification for permitting the
principal indebtedness to avoid tax. As the text indicates, tax equities require like
treatment of accrued interest and principal in the case of an insolvent non-corporate
debtor. A net assets approach should also relieve accrued interest from tax in the case
of an insolvent corporate debtor.
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payer."'"" The preceding discussion has been concerned with ascertain-
ing in what situations income may be realized on a discharge of indebt-
edness, and with the amount of such income. The further question exists
whether the income is "attributable" to the discharge of indebtedness,
for it is only to such income that Section 22(b) (9) applies. Where
the taxpayer has merely borrowed money from the creditor, the saving,
upon cancellation of the loan, is clearly attributable to the discharge of
the debt. But suppose that in payment for services performed by the
taxpayer, its creditor cancels the taxpayer's $5,000 debt. The $5,000
of income would here seem attributable not to the discharge of the debt
but to the performance of services. The discharge was the means of
payment but the income represented by such payment was derived from
compensation for personal service. Suppose the debtor is a stockholder of
the creditor corporation, so that the amount of the cancelled debt is a tax-
able dividend. While this case is closer to the line, the discharge here is
also but the means of payment, and the income is attributable not to the
discharge but to the relation of stockholder and corporation." 2 While
in the first case a consideration- the performance of services - is defi-
nitely present, some consideration in the form of a stockholder's expecta-
tion of dividends may be found in the second situation. Where con-
sideration is lacking, however, so that the discharge is not the medium
of payment but rather the source of the income, the new paragraph is
applicable.
(b) Treatment of bond premium and discount. Where bonds issued
at par are discharged through purchase by the obligor, the difference
between the face amount of the bonds and the amount for which they
were purchased measures the income to the corporation."0 3 The new
paragraph applies this test even where the bonds were issued at a pre-
mium or discount. The unamortized premium is treated separately,
although likewise excluded from income, and the unamortized deduction
is expressly disallowed, thus implying that it would otherwise be allow-
able. In computing the amount to be deducted from basis in the case
of bonds issued at a premium, the maximum is the difference between
the face amount and the purchase price plus the unamortized premium,
101. The word "income" would seem to mean "gross income," so that the phrase
refers to the amount otherwise includible in gross income but for §22(b)(9), rather
than a net figure reached by deducting any amounts properly allowable on the transac-
tion. The treatment of 'bond discount and premium supports this view. Moreover, the
paragraph relates to exclusions from gross income.
102. A contrary conclusion would reduce the basis by the full amount of the dividend
(under the assumption made in note 101 supra), whereas only 15% of such amount
would have been in effect taxed, due to the credit allowed by § 26(b).
103. The market value of the bonds, either at the time of purchase or on March 1,
1913, is immaterial. Consolidated Gas Co. of Pittsburgh, 24 B.T.A. 901 (1931); Vir-
ginia Iron, Coal &'Coke Co., 29 B.T.A. 1087 (1934).
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as both were excluded from gross income. In the case of bonds issued
at a discount, the amount of the unamortized discount, disallowed as a
deduction, must be subtracted from the amount excluded from gross
income- the difference between the face amount of the bonds and the
purchase price. Regulations 103, Section 19.22(a)-18 dealing with the
purchase of bonds in general, however, appears to adopt a different ap-
proach. It states that on the purchase of bonds formerly issued at a
premium, the gain or income on the transaction is the excess of the
issuing price minus any amount of premium already returned as income,
or the excess of the face value plus the amount of premium not yet
returned as income. In the case of bonds issued at a discount, the gain
or income is the excess of the issuing price plus any amount of discount
already deducted, or the excess of the face value minus the amount of
discount not yet deducted, over the purchase price. The courts have
applied the same rule in cases involving bonds issued at a discount.",
These courts and the Regulations may be merely stating the mathematical
computation in one transaction without going through the entire process
of including the difference between the face amount and the purchase
price in gross income and allowing the unamortized discount as a deduc-
tion. Or perhaps they are proceeding on the assumption that the amount
so stated is the income (the difference between the issuing price and
the purchase price is income resulting from the discharge, and the amount
of the amortized discount already deducted must also be included in
gross income to balance the previous deductions) and that there is no
deduction for unamortized discount. Either result would be adequate
for the purpose at hand. If a $100 bond were issued at $90 and pur-
chased for $80, there being $6 unamortized discount, the amount ex-
cluded from gross income under the Act and the first construction of the
Regulations would be $20, and the amount to be deducted from basis
would be $14. Under the second construction of the Regulations, the
amount excluded and the amount to be deducted would each be $14, no
deduction being disallowed as none was attributable to the unamortized
discount. Where the difference in approach may have a consequence, as
in the application of Section 275(c) in a situation where the saving on
the discharge was taxable because of the corporation's sound financial
condition, the assumptions of the Revenue Act of 1939 should be fol-
lowed, because that Act rejects the second interpretation of the Regula-
tions.
2. Kind of indebtedness. New paragraph (9) of Section 22(b)
applies only to indebtedness evidenced by a security. The term "security"
is defined to mean "any bond, debenture, note, or certificate, or other
104. Commissioner v. Norfolk S. R. R., 63 F. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933),'cerI.
denied, 290 U. S. 672 (1933); Norfolk S. R. R., 25 B.T.A. 925 (1932).
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evidence of indebtedness issued by any corporation, in existence on June
1, 1939." The paragraph as originally introduced was in effect limited
to bonded indebtedness, for the various evidences of indebtedness were
all qualified by the phrase "with interest coupons or in registered form.""10
But the qualification was removed, perhaps because the paragraph as
limited was thought to provide insufficient relief. 10 The phrase "other
evidence of indebtedness" should thus be broadly construed and not limited
by the words preceding it."0 7 Hence, any corporate debt, obligation or con-
tract liability evidenced by a written obligation in existence on June 1,
1939 and issued by a corporation is subject to the new provisions.'"
The indebtedness may be that of the taxpayer itself or another's in-
debtedness which the taxpayer has assumed. If the original indebtedness
is that of a corporation and is evidenced in writing and in existence on
June 1, 1939, the assumption by the taxpayer may be oral and may occur
after that date. If the original indebtedness, however, does not satisfy
the definition of a security, e.g., a partnership debt, the assumption by
the taxpayer corporation must meet that definition to fall within the
paragraph.Y00
3. Financial condition of taxpayer. The new provisions are not
operative unless the taxpayer is in "an unsound financial condition" at
the time of the discharge. Congress thought that a financially sound cor-
poration which finds it advisable to purchase its own bonds should be
required to pay tax at that time on the saving thus secured. This form
of income was thus regarded as no different from any other type. Relief
was to be accorded only to corporations in financial difficulties whose
ability to purchase their own bonds at less than face amount was largely
due to their own weakness, Congress, feeling that these corporations
should be encouraged to scale down their indebtedness, removed the tax
deterrent to such action by permitting a postponement of tax.
The taxpayer must establish to the Commissioner's satisfaction that
its financial condition is unsound, unless such condition is certified to that
105. H. R. 6851, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. §215, as introduced. The original wording
thus adopted the definition of "securities" used in § 23(k) (3). The same terminology
appears also in § 117(f).
106. 84 CONG. Rac. 10482 (1939).
107. Thus Mary D. Gerard, 40 B.T.A. 64 (1939) and Frank J. Cobbs, 39 B.T.A. 642
(1939), applying the doctrine of nocitur a sociis to exclude certain corporate obligations
from the provisions of § 117(f), are not pertinent to § 22(b) (9).
108. The term "issued" still has meaning. Thus U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(b)
(9)-1, states that indebtedness represented only by open account book entries is not
covered by the paragraph.
109. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(b) (9)-1. The words "any indebtedness of the
taxpayer or for which the taxpayer is liable" in §215(a), while seemingly redundant,
are intelligible if the phrase "indebtedness" is read with the modifier "evidenced by a
security," and in the light of the original limitation of "security" to bonded indebtedness.
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official by a Federal agency authorized either to lend to the taxpayer
or to exercise regulatory power over it."' The Commissioner is bound
by such certification, but, in its absence, is free to prescribe his own
standards if not arbitrary or unreasonable. The House Ways and Means
Committee Report offers the Commissioner two guides: (1) that insol-
vency is not a sine qua non-a corporation's liabilities need not exceed
its assets nor need it be unable to meet its current obligations as they
fall due to be in an unsound financial condition; (2) that a corporation's
obligations are selling in a free market at prices below their issue price
and below the market price of similar issues of similar businesses is
highly indicative of an unsound financial condition."'
4. Reduction of basis. Wrhile the new paragraph added to Section
22(b) excludes from gross income the amount of income attributable
to the discharge of the indebtedness, the new paragraph inserted in
Section 113(b) provides that such amount, or a part thereof, shall in
the Commissioner's discretion, as expressed in Regulations, be applied
in reduction of the basis of any property held by the corporation. The
wisdom of such a provision depends upon the answer to tao questions
of policy: (1) Shall the relief accorded to corporate debtors in financial
difficulties be absolute, in the sense that no tax shall ever be collected
with respect to the amount saved, or shall it be of a temporary nature and
the tax merely postponed? (2) If the latter, what form shall the recoup-
ment of tax take?
It has been argued with respect to the first question that there are
situations where complete tax immunity would be unwise. Suppose a
corporation has purchased a building in exchange for notes for $100,000.
Because of a decline in the building's value, the notes are discharged on
110. SEN. REP. No. 648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 5 recommended utilization of
information obtained by such other Federal agencies, thereby relieving the Commissioner
of the necessity of making an independent finding in such cases. Cf. 84 Co-.G. R .
10964-5 (1939). Presumably these agencies will not permit taxpayers to shop around
for such certificates but will only issue them when the taxpayer's financial condition is
involved in a matter pending before them. The Regulations do not state which Federal
agencies the section covers. The RFC and the ICC seem well within the definition
adopted; inclusion of the SEC may be doubtful.
111. H. R. RaP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 23-24. Cf. 84 CoNcG. Rr.
10469, 10486 (1939).
Sales below par or the market price of similar issues are not conclusive, however; such
sales may be due to a low interest rate or a long maturity. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103,
§ 19.22(b) (9)-1. It has been urged that the uncertainties inherent in the phrase "un-
sound financial condition" should be eliminated by the adoption of an arbitrary dividing
line, such as bonds selling at 40. But the range of the present bond market ill not per-
mit of any sensible point of division. If the figure is too low, many corporations %%ill be
unjustifiably deprived of relief; if too high, the Congressional desire to tax purchases by
clearly solvent corporations will be thwarted. Moreover, a figure stated in the statute
as a presumption or as a minimum might in administration become a binding maximum.
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payment of $30,000. If the $70,000 were merely eliminated from income,
the taxpayer corporation would still have a $100,000 basis for deprecia-
tion and gain or loss on the building, though the building actually cost
it only $30,000. If the taxpayer sells the building for $30,000 it will
have a $70,000 loss; if it sells for $100,000 it will pay no tax. But even
here the taxpayer is merely saving a tax once on $70,000, which is the
amount of relief supposed to be accorded. The situation does not in this
sense differ from that of the taxpayer which discharges a $100,000 loan
by payment of $30,000. While the basis of the building is not in line
with its actual cost, such a situation would exist in the case of a solvent
debtor which would have to pay tax on the $70,000, for the basis would
remain $100,000. There may be this difference between the taxpayer
which bought the building and the taxpayer which borrowed the $100,000:
when the former sells the building for $30,000 its condition may be such
that it should not be permitted to take a $70,000 loss, or if it sells it for
$100,000, it may be in a position to pay tax on a $70,000 gain. But
the taxpayer which borrowed the money may have recovered sufficiently
in the next few years to be able then to pay tax on the $70,000. Further-
more, if a distinction is to be drawn, where would the taxpayer which
borrowed $100,000 and invested it in a building find itself? The physical
tie-up between the building and the $70,000 saving should thus not be
determinative; the first example merely presents a situation in which
recoupment through reduction of basis is relatively simple to administer.
It is true of both taxpayers that if large losses have brought about
the unsound financial condition, the net loss carryover provision would
permit applying them to the next two years. This is perhaps undesirable,
if such years are profitable, for in effect those losses have been given
tax consequence through the refusal to tax the $70,000.112 Yet the
unsound financial condition may have been caused by heavy operating
losses in prior years which were in excess of gross income so that they
had no tax utility. Non-taxation of the $70,000 is merely a rough balance
for these earlier losses. It might be argued on the side of complete tax
forgiveness that the Government should, like the cancelling creditors,
forego its debt once and for all so that the debtor may be rehabilitated.
Such an argument, however, may be met by the assertion that the ques-
tion of ability to pay at such a time properly belongs in the field of
compromise of tax liability where it can be elastically handled, and is
not the occasion for an automatic forgiveness by refusing to recognize
income on the cancellation of indebtedness.
The argument narrows to the policy question, uncomplicated by other
aspects of the tax laws, whether the relief should be permanent or merely
112. This situation was presented in some of the cases. See Comm'r v. Simmons Gin
Co., 43 F. (2d) 327 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930) ; Burnet v. Campbell Co., 50 F. (2d) 487 (App.
D. C. 1931).
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temporary. Temporary relief will turn the immediate trick: rehabilitation
of the debtor that makes it unnecessary that he close his business, dis-
charge his workers and go into bankruptcy. But every tax which the
Government foregoes with respect to one taxpayer must be met by other
taxpayers. These other taxpayers might applaud the extension of the
helping hand at the crucial moment, but they might also require that the
rescued taxpayer, if he turns the corner and commences to profit, should
repay his debt to the Government and to them. Perhaps this contention
may be answered by the observation that merely keeping the debtor in
business prevents an increase in the load on the other taxpayers. Yet
they - joined by the debtor's immediate competitors - may still contend
that the relief be treated as a temporary loan to be repaid when the debtor
regains his feet.1 ' Whatever the validity of these arguments, Congress
has decided that the relief should be temporary by inserting a quid pro
quo in the form of a reduction in basis.
Two methods of regaining the tax lost for the year of cancellation
are sufficiently automatic in application to debtors as a group to make
them administratively feasible. One is to allocate the amount excluded
from gross income as a result of the discharge of indebtedness over the
next five or ten years in equal installments includible in gross income.
This method involves no administrative problems but has as a disad-
vantage the effect of a possibly burdensome tax in the very next year
and each succeeding year. It is also unorthodox in approach, being to
obviously a quid pro quo. The other method, adopted by Congress,
involves a reduction in the basis of the property held by the taxpayer.
Such reduction cannot be limited to property purchased with the cancelled
debt, assuming such a case to be involved, for the property may have
been sold or become worthless, but must be possible of extension to all
the property of the debtor. This necessitates a complex procedure under
which reduction in basis will proceed down through the various types
of property according to their susceptibility to such reduction, until the
amount to be so applied has been used up. Except for unusual situations,
however, such as where property whose basis has been reduced may be
sold at a profit in the next year, this method is more likely to postpone
the tax until a sunnier day. Similarly, the Commissioner has been vested
with considerable discretion in regard to the actual reduction to be made,
so that he is in a position to prevent hardships from occurring by reascon
of the quid pro quo decided upon by Congress.
1 4
113. The temporary nature of the relief also acts as some safeguard against rnanilu-
lation of § 22(b) (9) in the interests of tax avoidance.
114. H. R- REP. No. 855, op. cit. supra note 111, states, at 24: "The Cmmissi,n:r
is permitted not to reduce basis or to allocate all or a part of the reduction to stme pr,,p-
erty and a part or none to other property and the amount of reduction to Le allecated
to a particular property may be fixed by him." The exclusion from income under
§ 22(b) (9) is conditioned upon consent to the Regulations prescribed under § 113(b) (3).
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C. BANKRUPTCY ACT PROVISIONS REGARDING CANCELLATION OF
INDEBTEDNESS
The question of cancellation of indebtedness has been discussed so far
in terms of the applicable provisions of the Revenue Acts. There exist,
however, a number of Bankruptcy Act provisions which deal with the
tax consequences of a cancellation of indebtedness. These provisions,
for the most part adopted in 1938 and not affected by Section 215 of
the Revenue Act of 1939,"' may be summarized as follows:
A. With respect to
(a) A plan of corporation reorganization confirmed under
either Section 77B of the old Bankruptcy Act or Chapter X of
the Chandler Act;..1
(b) A composition agreement confirmed under either Sec-
tion 12 or 74 of the old Bankruptcy Act, or an arrangement
under Chapter XI of the Chandler Act;" and
(c) A "real property arrangement," under Chapter XII of
the Chandler Act," 8
no income is to be realized as a result of the modification or cancellation
of any indebtedness. However, the basis of the debtor's property, or
of such property as is transferred to any person required to use the
debtor's basis in whole or in part, is decreased by an amount equal to
the amount of the indebtedness cancelled. The Regulations state that
These Regulations provide the following order of basis reduction: the property for
whose purchase the cancelled indebtedness was incurred, property against which the
cancelled indebtedness was a lien, other property excluding inventory and notes and
accounts receivable, the amount being spread ratably over such property; inventory,
notes receivable, and accounts receivable, the reduction being made ratably. In filing his
consent, the taxpayer may request a variation from the general rule which the Connis-
sioner may grant. If the Commissioner rejects the proposed variation, the taxpayer will
be held to the general rule, unless it specifically did not consent to such application, in
which event the income would be taxable. The taxpayer may not treat part of the in-
come as taxable and part as subject to the relief afforded by § 215, for, if a consent is
filed, the Commissioner may reduce basis by the entire amount of income resulting from
the discharge. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.113(b) (3)-1, 2. Section 215 neglected to amend
§113(b)(2) to conform with the addition of new §113(b)(3). As §113(b)(2) is
probably declaratory of the proper rule, the s!ip should not be harmful. See SEN. Rri,.
No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 23-25.
115. The House Ways and Means Committee Report expressly states that the pro-
visions of the 1939 Act do not apply to a discharge of corporate indebtedness occurring
in any proceeding under § 77B or under Chapters X or XI of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, as amended. Op. cit. supra note 111, at 25. Chapter XV of that Act, enacted after
the Revenue Act of 1939, is likewise not affected by its provisions.
116. BANKRUPTcy Acr OF 1938, §§ 268, 270, 276(c) (3). Presumably reorganizations
under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act are subject to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended
by REVENUE ACT OF 1939, § 215.
117. BANKRUPTCY Acr OF 1938, §§395, 395, 399(4).
118. BANKRUPTcY Acr OF 1938, §§ 520, 522.
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the amount of reduction is the dollars and cents amount of the cancella-
tion, without regard to how much of that amount would be considered
income by the courts.110
B. With respect to
(a) A "wage earner's plan" confirmed under Chapter XIII
of the Chandler Act, as amended; 0 and
(b) A railroad adjustment under Chapter XV of the
Chandler Act, as amended," I
no income is to be realized as a result of the modification or cancellation
of any indebtedness, but the basis of the debtor's property is not reduced.
The statutory picture may be completed by a summary of the results
under the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Section 215 of the
Revenue Act of 1939:
C. With respect to
(a) A corporation in an unsound financial condition whose
indebtedness, evidenced by a "security" as defined in Section
22 (b) (9), is discharged in accordance with the conditions speci-
fied therein,
the amount of income attributable to the discharge may at the corpora-
tion's option be excluded from gross income, but in the event of such
exclusion the basis of the corporation's property is subject to reduc-
tion in accordance with the Commissioner's Regulations, the maximum
amount of reduction being the amount of income so excluded.
D. With respect to
(a) A taxpayer other than a corporation;
(b) A corporation in a sound financial condition; and
(c) The indebtedness of a corporation in an unsound finan-
cial condition not evidenced by a security as defined in Section
22 (b) (9),
the amount of income realized on a cancellation of indebtedness must
be included in gross income.
119. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.113(b) (1) -2. This interpretation has been criticized
as contrary to the Congressional purpose of debtor relief. See SE-.. rE. No. 1916, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 7, which may possibly be read as justifying a reduction in basis
only if the amount of forgiven indebtedness prevented by the Bankruptcy Act from
resulting in taxable income would in the absence of such Act actually constitute ta.able
income. Note also that no reduction is to be made on account of any accrued interest
unpaid which has not resulted in a tax benefit on any income tax return. On the other
hand the wording of the particular bankruptcy sections is clear--"an amount equal to
the amount by which the indebtedness of the debtor . . . has been cancelled or reduced."
(§ 270).
120. BANxrrmcy AcT or 1938, § 679.
121. BANxRUPTcY AcT § 735, as added by Pub. Res. No. 242, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
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D. GENERAL PROBLEMS PRESENTED
The diversity of treatment indicated by the summary in the preceding
Section cannot be justified. It demonstrates that while Congress desires
to relieve financially embarrassed debtors, it has no clear idea of the
relief to be granted. This mixture of tenderness and perplexity has
thoroughly confused the statutory treatment of cancellation of indebted-
ness. A few of the pressing problems which have resulted may be briefly
sketched.
The Bankruptcy Act, as stated above, relieves the debtor of any im-
mediate tax by providing that the cancellation of its indebtedness shall
not result in income. To allow eventual recovery of the tax, this Act
requires that the basis of the debtor's property shall be reduced by the
amount of indebtedness cancelled. This provision frequently makes the
cure worse than the disease. Bankrupt corporations with large amounts
of indebtedness may emerge from bankruptcy with a zero basis, for the
indebtedness cancelled will often exceed the former basis of the property.
To avoid this ridiculous situation such corporations may urge that a
large part of the indebtedness be continued, although this may mean the
retention of an unwise financial structure. Sometimes the argument that
a thoroughgoing reduction in indebtedness results in undesirable tax
consequences is used to cloak a preference for continuing an excessive
indebtedness. The automatic reduction in basis required by the Bank-
ruptcy Act thus serves either to block or hamper sound reorganizations
if the old corporation is retained. If a new corporation is formed to
acquire the assets, its basis will be either cost to it- generally fair
market value and hence a proper basis - or the debtor's basis, depending
on the applicability of the tax-free exchange provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. If these provisions require a substituted basis, the diffi-
culties discussed above are presented, since the basis must be reduced by
the indebtedness cancelled. The confusion existing in regard to the ap-
plicability of these provisions will be mentioned later. The unresolved
interpretative problem presented by an exchange of stock for bonds or
other debts has also muddled many a reorganization. Is the amount of
indebtedness cancelled the face amount of the bonds or the difference
between such amount and the value of the stock?
1 22
The Bankruptcy Act provisions have been criticized for requiring a
reduction in basis of the full amount of the indebtedness cancelled with-
out regard to whether income would otherwise be realized on the trans-
action. It has been suggested that the reduction be limited to the income
otherwise present. 12' But this hardly solves the present difficulties, for
122. The problem here is not whether the difference is income or a contributon to
capital, as under §215, but whether indebtedness has been cancelled and if so in what
amount. As many reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act involve the c change of
stock for bonds and other indebtedness, the point is of great importance.
123. Compare note 119 stepra.
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under one possible approach the full amount of the indebtedness is the
income realized, except where a contribution to capital is present. The
results desired - prevention of an immediate tax and the fixing of a
sound basis for the property- may perhaps be obtained by retaining
both the present provisions relieving from tax any income realized on
the cancellation and those requiring reduction in basis by the amount
of indebtedness cancelled, but adding a proviso that the basis of any
particular property shall not be reduced below its fair market value.
The feasibility of such a rule for taxpayers subject to the Bankruptcy
Act depends in large part upon the rule for non-Bankruptcy Act cases.
Taxpayers who can secure more favorable tax treatment outside the
Bankruptcy Act will strive to keep their reorganizations from becoming
subject to that Act. The tax-free exchange sections of the Revenue Acts
seem to have been applied by the courts with the purpose of providing in-
solvent corporations with a basis windfall upon their reorganization. Two
circuit courts of appeals and the Board have ruled that a tax-free exchange
exists if a corporation's bondholders, through a committee, buy in its
assets at a foreclosure sale and transfer such assets to a new corpora-
tion.12 4 The new corporation thus obtains the old corporation's basis,
which generally is far above the market value of the assets. This rule,
known as the Kitschnan doctrine, encourages corporations in need of
reorganization to avoid the Bankruptcy Act if possible, as the basis result
is so much more favorable than that prevailing under the Bankruptcy
Act. The refusal of these decisions to give effect to the foreclosure and
judicial sale is subject to valid criticism, 1' and the decisions can scarcely
be accepted as properly interpreting the reorganization provisions of the
various Revenue Acts. At the very least, the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Le Tulle v. Scofield120 warrants their reexamination.
If the Kitselnan doctrine is overruled, reorganizations by foreclosure
and judicial sale will be governed by the rules applicable to ordinary
foreclosures. This part of the law is an almost impossible tangle of
judicial decisions and administrative regulations occasioned by an absence
of explicit statutory rules. The bondholders obtaining the property may
find themselves simultaneously realizing both a deductible ordinary loss
and a taxable capital gain as a result of their purchase. By their control
124. Commissioner v. Kitselman, S9 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert. don:ed, 302
U. S. 709 (1938); Commissioner v. Newberry Lumber & Chem. Co., 94 F. (21) 447
(C. C. A. 6th, 1938); Southwest Consol. Corp., B.T.A. Memo. Op. Docket No. 93321
(Aug. 25, 1939); Marlborough House, Inc., 40 B.T.A. No. 133 (1939); Frederic: L
Leckie, 37 B.T.A. 252 (1938).
125. Cf. Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216 (1937).
126. Le Tulle v. Scofield, 60 Sup. Ct. 313 (U. S. 1940). Since the Le Tulle decision,
however, the Board has extended the Kitselnan doctrine to include the acquisition of the
assets by the holders of unsecured notes of the insolvent corporation. Alakarna Aspialtic
Limestone Co., 41 B.T.A. No. 51 (1940) (seven members dissented).
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over the bid price, however, they will often be able to manipulate the tax
consequences to their satisfaction.Y27 Judicial overruling of the Kitselman
doctrine should therefore be accompanied by a legislative correction of
the tax difficulties now presented in the case of foreclosures. Such legis-
lative solution should be along the lines (at least in the cases which
could otherwise be brought under the Bankruptcy Act) of providing a
basis of fair market value for the assets to be held by the new corpora-
tion and of giving the bondholders a deduction for their losses at the
time of foreclosure.
Even if the non-Bankruptcy Act transactions involving insolvent cor-
porations which do not properly come within the tax-free exchange pro-
visions are thus treated in conformity with the transactions governed
by the Bankruptcy Act, many reorganizations of insolvent corporations
may still be carried out so that the tax-free exchange sections are appli-
cable- e.g., statutory mergers or consolidations. The new corporation
will thus obtain the old corporation's high basis for the transferred assets.
Any tax on the cancellation of indebtedness may be avoided by the old
corporation's exercising the option afforded by Section 22(b) (9) and
by having the cancellation occur in such a way that only the basis of
assets, if any, retained by the old corporation is reduced under Section
113(b) (3). This problem could be sweepingly met by amending the basis
provisions applicable to all tax-free exchanges to provide that the trans-
feree's basis shall be either the transferor's basis or the fair market value
of the transferred assets at the time of the exchange, whichever is lower.
Such an amendment would also prevent the double deduction of losses
now made possible through a tax-free exchange. '1 2 1 In the instant situa-
tion it would, as respects the basis of the assets, conform tax-free ex-
change reorganizations of insolvent corporations with other reorganiza-
tions both in and out of the Bankruptcy Act.
The restricted scope of Section 215 of the Revenue Act of 1939 rai,es
other problems. While that Section relieves corporations in nnilsotinid
127. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(k)-3 provides that if mortg 'ged property is sold
to the creditor for less than the amount of the debt, and the creditor charges off the
portion of the indebtedness remaining unsatisfied as uncollectible, lie univ deduct such
amount as a bad debt. Loss or gain is measured by the difference htwe 1t .iie amount
of those obligations of the debtor which are applied to the purchase or bi,' "lice of the
property and the fair market value of the property. The fair viark-t -'", * i the property
is presumed to be the bid price, and such value becomes the :redito," I),. ! r the prop-
erty. See Paul, Federal Income Tax Problems of Mortgugors and , yeer, ,egs (1939)
48 YALE L. J. 1315, 1325 et seq.
128. E.g., W. & K. Holding Corp., 38 B.T.A. 830 (1938). T1 '.iiig O.e transferee's
basis down to the transferor's basis and the consequent possible double tax on the gain are
necessary to insure a single tax on the gain. The parties can generally avoid a second
tax. But as the parties could always secure the double deduction, there is no force to
the argument that both gain and loss be treated alike, and it is threfore fair to permit
only the transferor to obtain the loss deduction.
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financial condition, it leaves all other taxpayers subject to the prior
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. There is no justification for
confining that relief to corporate taxpayers. Every argument advanced
in support of the amendments made by the Revenue Act of 1939 can be
made on behalf of individuals and other non-corporate taxpayers.Y- While
it may be contended that the realization of income should not be affected
by the debtor's general financial condition, there is a strong emotional
pull toward either the net assets theory of the Board or the entire non-
realization of income where the debtor is insolvent or financially embar-
rassed. To press a tax upon the debtor under such conditions is to work
an obvious hardship. If Congress refuses to grant statutory relief through
a postponement of tax, the courts may afford the needed relief by judicial
construction of the term "income" in the Revenue Acts, and perhaps in
the Sixteenth Amendment. As this may involve either a distortion of
statutory provisions or a restriction on the scope of the taxing power,
it is preferable that Congress deal with the situation through ameliorative
legislation.
The new provisions added by the 1939 Act should therefore be extended
to all taxpayers in an unsound financial condition. They should likewise
be applied to all forms of indebtedness. The Commissioner, in addition,
should exercise his discretion to prevent the reduction in basis provided
for in Section 113(b) (3) from bringing the basis below fair market
value, in order to avert any hardship on this score. Fair market value
might be made a floor by statute. Such further amendments, or the
Committee Reports accompanying them, should state that the debtor's
financial condition is not material to the question of the realization of
income or its amount, so that the Congressional desire to obtain a quid
pro quo through reduction of basis may be accomplished. 13 0 While the
new provisions in the 1939 Act were on adoption thought to be experi-
mental and were limited largely to discharges occurring in the latter part
of 1939, and in 1940-1942, it seems clear that there will be no turning
back of the clock with respect to the granting of relief in these situa-
tions. It is therefore desirable to make them all-inclusive for such years,
1229. While problems presented by the reduction in basis may be more difficult in the
case of individuals, they may safely be left to the Commissioner's discretion.
130. Alternatively, the "income" realized on a cancellation could be made non-recog-
nizable and basis required to be reduced (but not below fair market value) in all caces
by the amount cancelled, except where a gift or a contribution to capital is present. This
eliminates the option and carries over the Bankruptcy Act approach. Either suggestion
would eliminate many questions as to the "income" realized on a cancellation. The man-
datory reduction in basis seems constitutional in the case of a corporation, where the
debt was presumably incurred in the business and the reduced cost occasioned by the
cancellation can be reflected in a reduced basis. Difficult cases presented by individual
and other taxpayers where the debt is not related to the cost of an asset or a business can
be avoided by a sensible exercise of the Commissioner's discretion.
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and then to determine on the basis of experience what further modifica-
tions are necessary before the provisions are made permanent.
These suggested solutions regarding the tax consequences of a can-
cellation of indebtedness are far from complete. But enough has been
said to support the proposition that this problem is as pressing as any
now facing us under the income tax. Piecemeal attempts by Congress
and the courts have brought taxpayers some relief, but the relief has been
balanced by the confusion and uncertainties these efforts have created.
The stage is now set for a thoroughgoing statutory solution.
